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COMMENTARY
Downsides of social capital
Alejandro Portes1
Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; and Department of
Sociology and Law School, University of Miami, Miami, FL 33124
In their article, Levine et al. (1) test the hy-
pothesis that ethnic homogeneity leads to
greater errors in the pricing of stocks because
of overreliance in the activities and decisions
of coethnics. Excessive trust in others, created
by ethnic homogeneity, can thus eventuate
in price bubbles negatively affecting not only
the traders, but the entire economy. The
authors test this theory on the basis of two
realistic, tightly controlled experiments com-
paring ethnically homogenous and heteroge-
neous trading networks. One experiment was
conducted in North America, where the rel-
evant ethnics groups were Whites, Latinos,
and African Americans; the second was in
Southeast Asia, with subjects of Chinese, In-
dian, and Malaysian origin. The distinctness
of the ethnic groups compared in both settings
adds to the generalizability of the findings.
The Communitarian Tradition
For a long time now, a tradition in the so-
cial science literature has deplored the loss
of “community” and the advent of indi-
vidualism, social atomization, and anomie.
This literature features prominent titles, such
as The Lonely Crowd (2), Habits of the Heart
(3), and Bowling Alone (4). This tradition
culminated in the celebration of “social
capital”—defined as participation in associ-
ations and general trust in others—as an
unqualified public good. Subsequently, Put-
nam (5) and his followers announced that
ethnic diversity, brought about by height-
ened immigration, reduced social capital,
hence negating the wide array of social ben-
efits attributed to it.
This declaration received wide attention,
scaring governments and members of the
public alike. It resulted in a veritable moun-
tain of research testing the relationship be-
tween immigration, ethnic diversity, and
social capital. Almost entirely, this literature
accepted the generalized positive effects of
communitarianism and trust and focused
on assessing the extent to which they were
damaged by immigrant flows and diversity
(6). Hence, the literature left the fundamental
premises of the argument praising social sol-
idarity and community bonds and disparaging
individualism and impersonal rules intact.
There has also been, however, a less
popular but equally important theoretical
tradition that focuses precisely on the
negative consequences of ethnic particu-
larism and excessive reliance on commu-
nity and trust. This tradition dates back at
least to Max Weber (7), who made imper-
sonality and universalistic rules in market
transaction the key defining characteristics
of modern rational capitalism, as opposed
to earlier particularistic forms. The tradi-
tion also encompasses Durkheim’s (8) dis-
tinction between mechanical solidarity, based
on social homogeneity and tight personal
bonds, and organic solidarity, based on role
differentiation, impersonal norms, and an
extensive division of labor.
Levine et al. test the
hypothesis that ethnic
homogeneity leads to
greater errors in the
pricing of stocks
because of overreliance
in the activities and
decisions of coethnics.
Negative Effects
More recently, other scholars in the same
tradition have focused on the negative con-
sequences of the much-celebrated social
capital of which two deserve mention. First,
as noted by Waldinger (9), the particularistic
benefits accruing to some by virtue of mem-
bership in ethnic or religious communities
is experienced by others as exclusion from
the same social and economic benefits (10).
Tight coethnic bonds allow the restriction of
the best jobs to members of the in-group,
thus requiring the intervention of imper-
sonal public agencies to break up the holds
of these bonds and open up opportunities
for others.
A second negative effect of social capital
consists of the excessive claims made on
successful members of a particular commu-
nity by others. As noted by Geertz (11) in his
study of failed enterprise in Bali, the demands
of kin and coethnics on successful business
men can easily sink promising entrepre-
neurial ventures, preventing capital accu-
mulation and turning firms into welfare
hotels. Granovetter (12) identifies this
problem as precisely the one that imper-
sonal, universalistic markets were designed
to resolve. The affinity of such markets to
the Protestant Ethic was exactly the core of
Weber’s (7) analysis of the moral under-
pinnings of modern, rational capitalism.
[A summary and systematization of the
negative consequences of social capital are
presented in Portes and Landolt (13).]
To these problems we can now add the
one that Levine et al. (1) highlight. In this
case, the negative consequences of social
capital, in the form of excessive in-group
trust, are felt not only by members of the
group, but by the entire society in the form
of market errors and bubbles, followed by
stampedes (14). This result stems from the
excessive confidence and comfort felt by
market players in the presence of ethnically
similar others and their consequent careless
way of monitoring real market fluctuations.
These results have two other theoretical
implications not discussed in Levine et al.’s
(1) article. First, not only ethnicity but other
bases of in-group solidarity and cohesion may
produce exactly the same results. A common
religious affiliation, common regional origin
(i.e., “Southerner,” “New Englander,” and so
forth), or even linguistic use and accent may
lead to the same patterns of trust in others
producing similar outcomes. Second, effects
of excessive communitarianism may extend
to areas other than the market. The political
health of nations can be also affected. In this
respect, it is worth recalling the warnings
of Berman (15) following her analysis of
the collapse of the Weimar Republic and
the advent of the Nazi party to power in
Germany. Berman (15) concludes her article,
“Bowling with Hitler,” on the following note:
The German case reveals a distinct pattern of
associationism that does not conform to the
predictions of neo-Tocquevillian Theory. German
civil society was rich and extensive—and this
nation of joiners should accordingly have provided
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fertile soil for a successful democratic experiment.
Instead, it succumbed to totalitarianism.
Undeniably, ethnic cohesion, solidarity,
and trust have a number of benefits for
communities and individuals. The eco-
nomic success of certain immigrant groups,
such as Russian Jews, Chinese, and Cubans
could not be explained in the absence of
such bonds (16, 17). Mutual trust among
employers, labor unions, and the state
has also played a well-documented role
in economic “miracles” in Denmark, the
Netherlands, and elsewhere in the re-
cent past (18–20), but along with these
and other benefits, social capital has
severe downsides.
The unmitigated celebration of commu-
nity, trust, and group cohesion in the social
capital literature has cast aside imper-
sonal regulatory institutions, universal norms,
and self-reliance as key elements of mar-
kets and society. This result is regrettable
because complex, modern economies can
scarcely operate without such elements.
As noted by Levine et al. (1), modern
corporations do not run on social capital
but on explicit rules and tight control of
particularistic motives. Levine et al.’s
article provides a valuable corrective to
communitarian celebration; given the im-
portance of its findings, they should be
replicated with other groups and in other
national contexts in the future.
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